Jazzak Allaahu Khayr for your comments.

Trofimov basically points out that many people believe that westerners were involved in combat at Haram, it also did not really make sense to me why Al-Sa’ud wouldn’t have used them although of course they’d be reluctant to talk about it. Also, he refers a couple of times to how different westerners needed by the regime would “take shahadah” in order to enter into Mecca. Still, I give Trofimov some credit for having done a lot of research for the book and it’s at least clear that he couldn’t get any firm source to back this up and for whatever reason he seems inclined to believe that they did not. Allaahu Alim.

Your last point is interesting to me. As I allude to in my post, it wasn’t clear to me that there was a strategy for how the rebels would take over the government…what would have made things a lot more interesting is if somehow they had gained the backing of some of the major scholars. Although the book suggests a relationship between the rebels and bin Baaz ideologically and talks about bin Baaz getting them released from prison earlier after “talking with them” I don’t remember it discussing any major effort of the rebels to get the scholars on their side. Although the account makes it seem the rebels were frustrated with the scholars backing of the regime (join the club!) maybe they hadn’t completely given up on them and thought there was some chance of the scholars backing them once they had taken over the Haram. (As I said, it is also possible that they didn’t really have a plan and were caught up in political and religious zeal and emotion).

You are right, though, that it seems one lesson that was learned is that it would have been more strategic to attack the regime directly rather than strike at the Haram. But if the maintenance of the Haram is seen as the key to the legitimacy of the family, I guess there’s some logic in trying to rest that away from them at the beginning.

Here’s a question I have for you Abu Sinan…perhaps my own loathing for the Al-Sa’ud has made it hard for me to understand how the average Sa’udi (I even hate to have to call the people Sa’udis since it seems like an insult to them) views the regime. No doubt they have complaints and know they are corrupt, puppets of U.S., etc. but when it comes down to it, is there really any support for getting rid of them? I would imagine that it would have been even less then. But it has to demoralizing to Al-Sa’ud to have spent so much money and had so many years pass and still always be unable to defend yourself militarily but always have to rely on others.
In short, you state that this small group came “close” to overthrowing the regime. If so, how come Al-Qa’ida which has (or at least had at one point) considerably more support was not able to mount any serious challenge?

It was a good book, but I think to a certain extent the author did not press too hard into the Saudi establishment’s telling of the story. For instance, my wife’s family all comes from Mecca and the story that I have heard that came from them is that it was a well known fact that Western troops DID take part in the combat at the Grand Mosque. It would make sense that it has been covered up.

To me it was amazing how a small group of people could come so close to overthrowing the Saudi regime. Had they attacked the King’s residence they might have done so.